No matter how you feel about Richard Dawkins, you can’t deny he plays an important role in the contemporary public discourse about religion and that his book ‘The God Delusion’ (hereafter, TGD) is an important text to understanding that discourse.
Personally, I find Dawkins’ books about biological science to be wonderful. As someone who doesn’t have a great education in the physical sciences, I find him to be invaluable resource in that respect. Sadly, I cannot repeat that praise for TGD, even though it is arguable that TGD is his most important work.
Whenever the TGD comes up in conversation, I usually express my dislike for the book, which in turn, causes people to challenge me to articulate what I find wrong with TGD, so this (and other upcoming) blog posts is a result of that.
On page 2, in the Preface to TGD, Dawkins states the following:
“Perhaps you have been taught that philosophers and theologians have put forward good reasons to believe in God. If you think that, you might enjoy Chapter 3 on ‘Arguments for God’s existence’ - the arguments turn out to be spectacularly weak.”
Now this is a strong claim, one that I wouldn’t make. I may be an atheist and remain unconvinced by theistic arguments, but I would never judge them to be spectacularly weak. Also note he singles out both philosophers and theologians, which means Dawkins intends to engage the best arguments from the professionals.
The arguments addressed in chapter 3 are: Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways, Ontological Argument, Argument from Beauty, Argument from personal experience, argument from scripture, Argument from admired religious scientists, Pascal’s Wager, Bayesian Arguments, the chapter is 32 pages long (77-109).
What immediately jumps out to me is the actual lack of modern arguments. For example, one of the most famous philosophers of religion is Richard Swinburne, who not only is a theist, is also a member of the Eastern Orthodox Church. He taught at Oxford from 1985 till 2002, a published highly influential books defending the coherence and rationality of theism.
What I don’t understand, is why Dawkins doesn’t deal directly with Richard Swinburne? He obviously knew of him, knew he’s a philosopher and a faithful Christian to boot. He mentions Swinburne in the next chapter concerning Divine Simplicity, so I don’t see any excuse to omit his work from Chapter 3. Dawkins’ oversight does a disservice to the atheist readers he seeks to inform, because he essentially leaves his fans completely defenseless to any theistic thinker who bothered to read the modern literature (or taught by an apologist what to say in response).
In The ‘Existence of God’, Swinburne readily admits that the variety of traditional arguments for God’s existence, when considered alone and deductively, are not sound. Swinburne’s strategy is to asses the arguments for theism along inductive lines, using two categories for assessment: First is a C-inductive argument, which raises the probability of a hypothesis, and P-inductive argument, which makes a hypothesis more probable than not. Swinburne then picks out several arguments that he feels make a good C-inductive arguments, and the conjunction of these arguments make for a P-inductive argument for theism.
Swinburne’s strategy has been in print since 1979, and what even frustrates me even more, is that the probability calculus that Swinburne employs is Bayes’ Theorem, which is the last thing Dawkins addresses in Chapter 3, but instead of dealing with Swinburne, Dawkins’ target is Stephen Unwin. So…ignore the Oxford Philosopher with a strong reputation and target a risk management consultant? Really?
Chapter 3 is such a painful read, for example, on page 106 Dawkins observes:
“But of course that final estimate can only be as good as the original numbers fed in. These are usually subjectively judged, with all the doubts that inevitably flow from that.”
Anyone who has spent anytime closely examining arguments for theism from actual scholars (and not apologists), you become use to their unassuming and modest attitude. Swinburne takes into account subjectivity of the various evidentiary values, and even makes honest concessions (on page 289, my copy of The Existence of God comes from the revised 91 edition):
“All this so far is very imprecise, but, as we have seen we just do not have the criteria for very precise estimation of probabilities in science or history or most other fields. However I now suggest that it is reasonable to come to the following qualitative judgment about the force of the evidence so far considered…Theism does not have a probability close either to 1 [100%] or 0 [0%], that is, on the evidence considered so far, theism is neither very probable nor very improbable. It does not have a probability close to 1 because it does not have predictive power.”
Swinburne doesn’t make any radical claims, like Unwin apparently does, and spills much ink in justifying his values, and that deserves a fair treatment, if not a close and detailed one.
Dawkins is a total let down: